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IRAN AND ISRAEL: THREE POINTS

  • Writer: Paul Hansbury
    Paul Hansbury
  • Jun 17
  • 5 min read

Updated: Jun 18

When Israel launched Operation Rising Lion last Friday, it sparked a new round of crisis decision making in global capital cities. A long-simmering conflict had rapidly escalated. Israel attacked Iran's nuclear facilities at Natanz and Isfahan, as well as key military installations. Israel's operation also succeeded in assassinating several senior Iranian figures, including the chief of staff of the armed forces, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), and the head of the IRGC's intelligence unit. A significant number of Iranian citizens have been killed in the attacks.


Iran responded with waves of ballistic missile attacks against Israel, some of which have penetrated Israel's missile defences. A small number of Israeli citizens have been killed as a result. US president Donald Trump called on the warring sides to 'make a deal' – which seems to be his answer to everything – and he even reportedly mooted the idea that Russia could be a peace-broker. Given Russia's strategic interests in Iran, not to mention the US's own interests, surely few western leaders would willingly contemplate allowing Russia a prominent role.


I argued before that Iran could be the spark of a bigger conflict (see my blog post from last October). In that text, I pointed to the deepening military ties between Iran and Russia, among other things. In a follow up post, I explained the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz through which roughly a quarter of all the oil traded globally passes, as does a large share of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Iran has the capability to shut the Strait with ramifying effects on the price of oil and LNG. Russia, note, would be a major beneficiary of higher hydrocarbon prices since it remains a major source of supply despite western sanctions.


As we scramble to make sense of the latest developments in the Middle East and the potential for other states to intervene, here are three points I think worth keeping in mind.


We should acknowledge nuclear hypocrisy


The American philosopher John Rawls made an argument about justice based on 'a veil of ignorance'. He asked whether we would consent to a particular kind of society if we did not know which position we would occupy in it (e.g. what our race or gender might be). Would we deem a capitalist society a fair one if we did not know what position, and how wealthy, we would be when living in it?


I sometimes use a Rawlsian argument when I think about nuclear weapons and proliferation. I think most of us would conclude that in an ideal and just world no one should possess nuclear weapons. Would many people seriously argue for the current status quo, with a mere nine states possessing nuclear weapons and all the rest not, if they were to wake up tomorrow randomly assigned as a national of any existing state? Probably not.


But life is not a thought experiment and nuclear weapons exist. I do not favour unilateral disarmament and therefore I must admit a selfish patriotic interest. Let those of us, British or American, who argue that Iran must not obtain a nuclear weapon but that we should retain our own nuclear arsenal not pretend our position on proliferation is cogent.


Double standards are part and parcel of international relations. Trump argued a couple of days ago that the negotiations between the US and Iran, begun a couple of months ago, were the best path for resolving Israeli concerns about Iran's nuclear programme. (Though he also said of the Iranians: 'they lie, they cheat, they string the US along.') Yet it was Trump who, during his last presidency, pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); he did not think that the agreement, resulting from negotiations, had constrained Iran's nuclear ambitions.


We should recognise that Iran is a bad actor


A nuclear Iran probably should worry us. A powerful argument by Matthew Syed portrays the Iranian regime is a 'death cult', pointing out how it celebrates indoctrinated children who volunteered to clear minefields or run into enemy fire during the Iran-Iraq war. Its fundamentalist leaders, he argues, would use nuclear weapons without the restraints of more rational leaders (he includes Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-Un in the latter category).


'Religious fanatics... want to die,' says Syed. 'It's why it is not just conceivable but probable that an ageing fundamentalist leader would launch a nuclear strike against Israel, and feel closer to Allah as the inevitable response loomed large on the radar screen.' I cannot be confident that the Iranian leaders really see it this way but it is certainly plausible. They do see the US and its allies as evil forces.


Iran's anxieties about western intentions are not entirely inexplicable. The Americans, with British support, helped to overthrow the regime of Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 must surely be understood, at least partially, as a long term consequence of that coup. In recent years, Iran has been subject to western sanctions, cyberattacks such as Stuxnet, and constant political and media criticism – and its leaders conclude that the US and its allies want to see them ousted.


At the same time such watchful suspicion does not justify the Iranian regime's behaviour towards its own citizens. The brutality of the regime is plain to see. Its human rights record is appalling, with dissidents routinely 'disappeared' in the 1990s. Repressions never seem far away. Nationwide protests in 2022-23 led to thousands of arrests, the torture of people in prison, and hundreds of the protesters were tried and executed. According to Human Rights Watch, Iran is one of the leading users of capital punishment, sometimes applying it for crimes committed as a child. In 2024 nearly 1,000 Iranians were executed. It has strict enforcement of dress codes and restrictions of freedom of assembly and speech.


Whatever happens in the Middle East, sympathy must lie with the Iranian people not the regime. No doubt there is some support for the regime, though we have seen sufficient evidence of discontent and have qualified evidence to be sceptical of any claims it reflects the popular will. Though I am wary of the chatter about regime change; externally encouraged regime change seldom works out well. One could look to neighbouring Iraq, or to history and the toppling Mossadeq.


The US, UK and most of Europe will back Israel come what may


Israel suffered a horrific assault on 7 October 2023 but there is much to rebuke it for in what followed. I said at the time that Israel will be justified in responding, but feared it would go in heavy-handedly. Israel's response has indeed been disproportionate and too often indiscriminate. The suffering in Gaza is tragic to witness and a huge swathe of global public opinion has been highly antipathetic towards many of Israel's claims in the past eighteen months. Gazans have been the victims of a heavy-handed military campaign against Hamas and its allies. Many European politicians have expressed concern about Israeli actions.


A wily Benjamin Netanyahu, criticised behind closed doors by some European diplomats, has almost certainly got traditional allies back on side through the military actions against Iran. Suggestions that Trump is considering whether to involve the US militarily are hard to assess: his vice president says that Trump 'may decide he needs to take further action to end Iranian [uranium] enrichment.' The US cannot achieve that short of an extensive military intervention, in my opinion, given the long history of failed diplomatic talks, economic sanctions and the fact the key enrichment sites such as the Fordow plant are underground in the mountains (so as to be safe from missiles). If the US joins Israeli strikes, I would expect that to morph into talk of 'boots on the ground' before too long.


Netanyahu claims to be doing Israel's allies a favour by forcing the Iran situation to its crisis. The consequences of his wiliness may be far wider than Iran's future, however, if the US involves itself militarily (as it might). Or if Russia gives overt backing to Iran (as it also might) and Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz. We will all pay more for petrol, at the very least.

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