THE COMEDY OF ERRORS
- Paul Hansbury

- 4 days ago
- 8 min read
Updated: 3 days ago
In the film Wag the Dog, the president of the United States, two weeks before an election, is accused of a dalliance with an underage girl in the White House. His campaign team, fearing the scandal will ruin his chance of re-election, hires a spin doctor who decides that the president needs a successful war to distract attention and buoy public support. And so America launches a fictional war with Albania. The White House hires a Hollywood director to create the scenes in a film studio, and... why not? 'What does anybody know about Albania?' asks the spin doctor at one point.
Although I find it flabbergasting, I am stuck with the conspiratorial view that the Iran war is quite plausibly explained by President Donald Trump wanting to take media attention away from the Epstein saga. The idea that Iran was 'two weeks away' from having a nuclear weapon, as the White House claims, or that it was about to attack the United States... those simply do not run. Whereas those Trump-Epstein titbits were getting juicier, with allegations of sexual assault against Trump released at the beginning of March.
There are always different perspectives, but try as I might there seems no way of spinning the current situations favourably for the US. Trump has concocted quite the farrago! For all America's military superiority, it does indeed feel like a turning point for US power in international affairs. I expect it is an exaggeration to call it America's 'Suez moment', by which I mean a point at which the world recognises America as no longer the major power it once was, though that idea is being bandied round widely.
What we can say is that few look at America and see a responsible superpower any longer, even if its actual power is undiminished, even if it is still far more powerful than any other state. I do not pretend to have anything novel or insightful to add to the reams of content written by others, I simply have an urge to write about America's wanton throwing away of its prestige as it is happening... Whilst I think the Suez analogy is de trop, I do agree that this moment reveals a lot about the changing balance of power.
Advantage China and Russia
China and Russia share a commitment to seeing a multipolar world supplant US hegemony. In 1997 they signed a joint declaration on the matter, pledging to 'promote the multipolarisation of the world and the establishment of a new international order.' They have more recently talked of a 'dual opposition' to the West and have deepened cultural, economic and security ties. There are many reasons why they will not endure as close partners in the long run; on seeing a shift in the balance of power away from America, however, they are in concord.
They may believe that they are now witnessing the ugly end of US hegemony. The Iran war, in terms of US policy, is one that made little sense from the beginning. As I wrote elsewhere, Russia has provided military intelligence to Iran, helping it to hit US targets, while Ukraine offered to supply know-how on drone interception to the US to defend it from those attacks. At the same time, Trump remains sympathetic to Russia's war aims in Ukraine and has helped it in its war by withdrawing US military and intelligence support from the Ukrainians. Just think about how incoherent that is as a US foreign policy stance: helping Russia whilst it hinders the US.
As I've written previously, I think Russia's credentials as a supplied of regime security are dented by its inability to stop the US arresting Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro and assassinating Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Beyond that, though, it has obviously reaped benefits. Aside from the rising oil prices, the US eased its sanctions regime on Russia and, a point Timothy Snyder makes, no one has given any suggestion that those sanctions might be reimposed any time soon (or ever). Snyder also points out that Trump blames his allies for everything that's gone wrong and does not blame Russia at all, despite it having actively supplied Iran with intelligence to target US capabilities. For the Kremlin, it must surely be a dream to hear a US president say he will not defend European NATO territory.
Similarly, I wrote previously that the Gulf States might be disappointed in China's keeping away after all its past promises of close partnership. But there are bigger questions directed to the US from the Gulf States; it is US actions, not Chinese, that have prompted Iranian attacks on them. For that reason, China, too, looks likely to emerge a big winner as states question the credibility of US security commitments. Moreover, the Chinese will be studying how the US prosecutes the Iran war and applying the lessons to a potential future war with the US over Taiwan. All the while, they keep some of their own military capabilities and tactics under wraps.
Both Moscow and Beijing see how NATO is divided. Its Secretary-General, Mark Rutte, yesterday tried to defend Trump for not consulting allies in advance of the war. 'Trump wanted to retain the element of surprise,' said Rutte. (Gotta love surprises!) But that only works as an argument if you don't reflect on it for more than an instant. Because it was not a surprise. Iran knew it was coming, that is why it redeployed military capabilities in the weeks before the attacks and kept telling the US not to start a war. Britain knew it was coming, that is why it redeployed radars, Typhoon jets and drone teams to the Middle East as early as January. It makes more sense to realise Trump does not care what anyone else thinks.
What humiliation?
No one seriously doubts that US military capabilities exceed Iranian capabilities. In the past few weeks the US has, despite the word's overuse, not to mention its premature use, 'decimated' Iran's military. On paper, the US would surely prevail decisively if it did fight on. The obvious question, then, is why the US does not do so? The Iranian regime is daring it to fight on to the end and Trump is clearly reluctant, probably because he fears a domestic backlash. He appears to fear being sucked into a protracted fight with IRGC insurgents in mountainous terrain, with its echoes of the Afghanistan war, which I suspect is what would be required before a decisive victory could be declared.
The White House, instead, proclaims its 'decisive' and 'historic' victory as having already been won. It also agreed to a two-week ceasefire based on a ten-point plan put forward by the Iranians. Because, naturally, you agree to a ceasefire, based on the enemy's terms no less, when you have decisively defeated that enemy. There are different versions of the ten points in circulation, though the gist of them is the same. Trump initially called the ten points a 'workable basis' for negotiations that will take place this weekend in Pakistan. War Secretary Pete Hegseth said that the Iranians 'begged' for the ceasefire. To many of the rest of us, to stop fighting on the basis of the ten points looks like a US capitulation. It does not really add up.
One obvious issue is that the ten-point plan explicitly allows Iran to enrich uranium. A separate point has Iran affirming that it will not enrich uranium for weapons use. Well, that's okay then. Except it has always claimed that it has no such intentions. Nothing has been conceded by Iran on this point. In fact, it seems a great coup for Iran were the US to agree publicly that it can enrich uranium. One of the US's war aims was to destroy Iran's uranium stockpiles, after all.
Another point refers to the withdrawal of US forces from the region. Is that implying that the US would withdraw from all its long-standing bases in the Middle East? That seems unlikely. But it is included as part of the ten-point 'workable basis' for negotiations. How does that reflect a decisive US victory? Aside from the humiliation even leaving one or two bases would entail, not least because the US would be in a far weaker regional position than the status quo ante, Trump did not need to fight a war to withdraw US troops.
The plan also gives Iran control over the Strait of Hormuz, possibly taking a toll for each ship that passes through it. Prior to the war, Iran did not fully control the strait, since it was international waters, and oil tankers passed through it freely. The strait only closed after the US-Israeli attacks began. During the war, Trump kept telling everyone how easy it would be to force the strait open and that the US did not need anyone's help. After US allies didn't send any help he blamed them for the US's failure to open the strait. Iran may share proceeds from the proposed toll with Oman, but no money will go to the US, and everyone other than Iran and Oman will lose out if a toll is implemented since passage was previously free (and the toll, in any event, would breach international law). How is this a US victory?
Other points refer to the lifting of all US sanctions on Iran, unfreezing its assets, and Iran receiving compensation for war damages. Much of Iran's infrastructure and military may have been devastated, but any longer term peace deal based on the ten-point ceasefire would leave Iran in a stronger position than it was prior to the US military strikes. The regime is still in place despite its senior leadership having been assassinated.
The only thing the US gets out of the ten-point plan is an end to the war which it need not have started in the first place. You do not need any specialist training to see through Trump's assertion that there has been regime change in Iran. That is absurd. Moreover, no one seems sure how many missiles and drones Iran still has left. The US claims that all war aims have been 'decisively achieved' is therefore a lie, especially if counting political goals such as regime change. Note how Trump's promise to Iranian citizens in January that 'help is on its way' segued neatly into a genocidal threat to wipe out their whole civilisation a few days ago.
Curiouser and curiouser
And Trump goes on expecting the crowd's adulation. And, one imagines, a peace prize for ending a war which he started, and for getting ships to move through the Strait of Hormuz even though they aren't and even though they were before he started the war that stopped them moving through it. For getting a nuclear deal with Iran, even though there used to be a better deal, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, until Trump tore it up. Great negotiating skills!
Little adulation, though. Don't worry, Donald! Melania, as any good wife might, has your back. Concerning that war you might have started to take the heat off you on Epstein, that 'excursion' in Iran that you now need the media distracted from so as to take the heat off... Well, Melania's come out and – and she reportedly kept it as a surprise, too (gotta love surprises!) – she's said she had no relationship with Epstein and was not his victim. Sure, most of us never thought she did or was but what the hell! Good old Melania! She's done you a favour, Donald, in making sure the front pages today are all filled with the Epstein saga again.
Anyway, that ceasefire looks shaky, with both sides inevitably accusing the other of breaching its terms. And the Russians and Chinese are certainly noticing the damage to America's reputation. Trump travels to Beijing soon and the Chinese may well find ways of slighting him diplomatically, because they are good at that.
China used to have an official state policy of keeping a low profile and biding its time (taoguangyanghui). It was premised on the conviction that China would inevitably overtake the US in the power stakes if it just waited. And it was a wise policy.



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