PUTIN'S "NO-VICTORY" PARADE

At the weekend, Russia held its annual Victory Day parade marking the defeat of Nazi Germany. This year's military parade was scaled back, owing to security concerns, and there were no tanks or missile transporters rolling across Red Square. Lasting only 45 minutes, the parade was also briefer than usual.

Much media reporting outside Russia interpreted the scaled-back parade as symbolic of the difficulties Russia is facing in Ukraine. The BBC and al Jazeera both led with the viewpoint that tanks were absent because they were needed on the frontlines. To my mind, the Kremlin's security concerns reflected a more telling indication of difficulties: Russian officials feared a Ukrainian drone attack on the event. Ukraine has been able to penetrate Moscow's air defences recently and is hitting targets deep inside Russia with its drone strikes; officials in Russia clearly feel vulnerable to attacks.

If we step back from the parade, there are at least three factors revealing that all is not well in Russian politics right now. First of all, declining approval ratings for the Russian leader are of increasing concern to the Kremlin. Secondly, mounting dissatisfaction with the war in Ukraine, uncertainty about the economy, and stirrings of discontent about mobile internet restrictions suggest Russian citizens are increasingly, if cagily prepared to act. Lastly, a conveniently timed leak of a 'European intelligence report' claimed that Vladimir Putin is on 'high alert' fearing a coup or assassination attempt. Whilst not very convincing overall, the report nonetheless provides evidence of the growing paranoia of the Putin regime.

Despite these factors, I find it hard to think that the end of the Putin era is imminent. Before coming to that, however, consider each of these contextual factors.

Putin's time of troubles

Polling firmly shows declining approval for the Russian leader. The state pollster, VTsIOM, stopped publishing its weekly approval ratings at the end of April after weeks of sliding approval for Putin. Its latest published data found approval for Putin at 65.6%, ten percentage points lower than at the beginning of February (see Table 1).

Table 1: Approval for President Vladimir Putin in 2026 [Source: VTsIOM]

1 Feb.	8 Feb.	15 Feb.	22 Feb.	1 Mar.	8 Mar.
75.1%	74.8%	74%	72.9%	73.3%	72.9%

15 Mar.	22 Mar.	29 Mar.	5 Apr.	12 Apr.	19 Apr.
72%	70.1%	70.1%	67.8%	66.7%	65.6%

Further evidence comes from the independent Levada Center. Its latest poll, conducted in April, finds Putin's electoral rating below 50% for the first time since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. 49% of respondents said they would vote for Putin if there were an election now. The question is open-ended – in that it does not suggest possible answers – and that is likely to inflate the response rate for the incumbent given his visibility to Russian citizens. It should be noted, mind, that immediately prior to the invasion the proportion of respondents saying they would vote for Putin was lower still, at 32%, and so the significance of the decline should not be overstated.

The Kremlin takes note

Reasons for Putin's declining popularity are not hard to find. One obvious reason is the lack of a decisive victory in the war in Ukraine and citizens' dismay at the lives being lost. A plausible recent estimate puts the death toll for Russia since February 2022 at more than 300,000 (and total casualties round the million mark). For all the loss of life, the frontline remains more or less static. Putin claimed in his Victory Day speech that Russia's 'heroes' are advancing – but that is hardly so. Between 7 April and 5 May, according to data from the Institute for the Study of War, Russia registered a net loss of 46 square miles of territory. Previously staunch supporters of Putin, such as lawyer Ilya Remeslo, are publicly criticising the president for the failings in the war.

Another reason is the lacklustre economy. Although repeated western media claims of an imminent economic implosion are best ignored, since the heralded collapse never materialises, Putin has recently begun to acknowledge economic challenges in his public remarks. Russia's GDP contracted in the first quarter of 2026 ( –0.5% year-on-year), falling short of the central bank's forecast of 1.6% annualised growth. This, too, is prompting more and more people to speak out, such as the recent tirade from celebrity Victoria Bonya (admittedly, she lives outside Russia).

Surveys by the Levada Center show growing despondency. Consumer sentiment (i.e. how optimistic people feel about their finances and the economic situation) is declining, whilst expectations of unemployment are ticking upwards. If the Russian economy continues to contract, citizens will only become more discontented.

Table 2: Socio-economic sentiment amongst Russians [Source: Levada Center].

	Feb. 2024	Aug. 2024	Feb. 2025	Aug. 2025	Feb. 2026
Consumer sentiment index	118	109	113	110	104
Unemployment expecations	16%	18%	21%	24%	32%

Description: The consumer sentiment index has a range of potential values from 0 to 200, where higher numbers represent positive sentiment. A figure of 100 would represent a balance of positive and negative assessments among survey respondents. The expectations of unemployment indicator is the percentage who think unemployment will rise in society; it does not reflect the respondent's view of their own job security.

A falling tsar?

Russian citizens have long had plenty to complain about, from crime and corruption to the lack of rule of law to poor public services. The Kremlin has succeeded in channelling Russians' anger away from Putin, however, and popular dissatisfaction has historically been directed at the government or local officials. Even if this is now starting to change, the prospects of the opposition taking advantage are limited.

The Russian state has long repressed opponents, killing and imprisoning dissenters. This has left the opposition fragmented and many of its keenest voices living in exile. As a result of the Kremlin's close management of the political space, and the information space, most Russians do not see any viable alternatives to the status quo. Who would they transfer their political loyalty to? In the recent Levada poll that had Putin's electoral rating a smidgen under 50%, the figures next most likely to receive votes were Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov (1.1%) and the current prime minister Mikhail Mishustin (1%). These are not opposition figures (Zyuganov is part of a 'systemic opposition', at best).

So it does not seem that Putin faces an organised political challenge at home, though ongoing restrictions on mobile internet services are raising the stakes (see my comment at the end of the previous blog). Ultimately, though, all the while opposition to Putin lacks a figurehead in Russia to rally round, it is difficult to see Putin wobbling. But what about someone within the regime itself emerging to challenge Putin? Could people support an insider taking on Putin?

In this context, the claims of a coup plot that appeared a few days ahead of Victory Day were somewhat mischievous. On 4 May, Important Stories published in full a report that it said had been written by 'an intelligence service of a European Union country.' It said the Kremlin was on 'high alert'.

The leaked report contained information that is neither new nor entirely surprising. Moreover, much of the information is consistent with heightened security at a time when Ukraine is succeeding in penetrating Russian air defences. It hardly warrants the leap to the conclusion that Putin fears a coup. Its suggestion that former defence minister Sergei Shoigu is a 'potential destabilising actor' does not chime with any perceptions of him before now, and the lack of evidence to substantiate the claim undermines the report's credibility. The descriptions of new measures affecting Kremlin staffers and surveillance of military officers are interesting though and the main takeaway from the report is the Kremlin's increasing paranoia.

Still, a military or palace coup is always possible – as Yevgeny Prigozhin's 2023 mutiny reminded us – and a coup could be the trigger for prominent, exiled opponents of Putin's Russia such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky or Ilya Yashin to return to Russia. So whilst I find it hard to think that Putin's end is imminent, it is easier to imagine domestic circumstances changing suddenly. Then the likelihood of Putin's fall rises, as well.