MR ZELENSKYY GOES TO WASHINGTON

It seems there were two main outcomes from the summit between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin on Friday. These provide context for Ukrainian president Volodomyr Zelenskyy's visit to the White House today where he hopes to avoid a repeat of February's slanging match.

To begin with, there was Trump's shift on the need for a ceasefire in Ukraine. He had gone into the summit with Putin talking tough. He had suggested that he might walk out of the meeting quickly if Russia did not agree to a ceasefire. Furthermore, speaking at the Kennedy Center, he said that there would be 'very severe consequences' for Russia in such circumstances. And then... Trump came out of the summit sounding like a patsy. He said that he saw no need for a ceasefire and instead supports going directly to a permanent peace deal.

As I've written before, Russia almost certainly thinks it can gain more by continuing to wage war than it can from talks. For that reason it is not all that surprising Putin did not agree to a ceasefire. But even if Trump understands Putin's thinking on that point, it was no reason to publicly decry calls for a ceasefire which only serves to strengthen Russia's position.

The second outcome is more perplexing. According to US envoy Steve Witkoff, Russia accepts that the US could be part of security guarantees for Ukraine after a peace deal is struck. There are several things to say about this. What does it entail? In what sense is it -- to use Witkoff's term -- a 'concession' wrought from Russia? And how likely is it to come to fruition?

I discuss those questions below. The other things to have emerged since the Alaska summit seem unremarkable. Trump's statements that Ukraine will not get Crimea back and that Ukraine will not join NATO reflect established positions among the current administration. Though on the first issue it does not mean that the US needs to recognise Russian sovereignty over Crimea (see my earlier comment on the Stimson doctrine).

Security guarantees

Witkoff told CNN: 'We agreed [with the Russians] to robust security guarantees that I would describe as game-changing. We managed to secure the following concession: that the United States could offer protection comparable to [NATO] Article 5.'

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is the collective defence clause, the article that says members will come to the aid of another should it be under armed attack (see my recent blog here for more detailed discussion of Article 5). Witkoff is implying that Russia agrees to the US coming to Ukraine's aid if it is attacked. It is hard to comment without more details about what exactly is meant here. It is implausible that the current US administration would contemplate deploying troops to Ukraine; Trump has said over and over that the US will not do that. It is also hard to believe that the US would agree to 'offer protection comparable to Article 5' under a president so ambivalent about NATO and especially its Article 5 commitments.

I am then struck by Witkoff's claim that this is a concession on Russia's part. Many people will be scratching their heads and asking how an agreement between Ukraine and third parties (i.e. not Russia) is a concession. Surely, they will say, it has nothing to do with Russia what Ukraine agrees with the US. The comment is revealing about Witkoff's world view: he is a 'realist' in that he thinks power matters above all else; in the world there are the great powers who each commands a sphere of influence. Ukraine has few rights vis-à-vis Moscow. It is only from this perspective that Witkoff's comment – or Trump's tendency to blame Zelenskyy for 'what he's done' – begins to make sense: Zelenskyy is expected to appease Russia because it is in Russia's sphere of influence.

The 'might makes right' worldview of Trump and Witkoff explains other uses of language, too. Consider Trump's social media post at the weekend. He wrote on Truth Social: 'President Zelensky of Ukraine can end this war immediately, if he wants to.' Strictly speaking: Yes, Ukraine can surrender. But we note Trump never points out that President Putin of Russia can end this war immediately if he wants to. Putin can order the withdrawal of his troops. Trump will not point that out because for him Russia is a great power and that gives it a right to invade a neighbouring state.

And thus, Ukraine must bow to Russia's demands in Trump's view. The 'swapping of territories' Trump referred to ahead of his summit with Putin is no school playground Panini-sticker swap where each party gives something to the other. Instead Russia 'gives' Ukraine territory it claims it would otherwise conquer by force. Yet Ukraine is reluctant to do this which leads to the last of my questions: how likely are the mooted security guarantees to come to fruition?

The media often talks of Ukraine's constitution as a block on ceding any territory to Russia. I think that is a bit of a red herring. The real obstacle is the military necessity of retaining the parts of the Donbas Ukraine still controls. Ukraine has staved off Russian attacks because it has rows of defensive fortifications. If Ukraine were strong-armed into ceding the whole of the Donbas, that would be to give Russia a helping hand round some of Ukraine's toughest defences. I do not know how long it would take Ukraine to fortify a new defensive line, but for some time Russian forces would have an open door to advance deeper into Ukraine if they received orders.

After years of war, and in a situation where Russia is slowly but surely gaining more ground in Ukraine, Putin is not going suddenly to yield Crimea and the occupied parts of the Donbas. That would be a humiliation for him. But if the US insists on Ukraine accepting Russia's current demands in return for security guarantees, that would serve to help Russian forces bypass Ukraine's existing defences. Ukraine is hardly likely to agree to give up the whole of the Donbas for this reason.

Mr Zelenskyy goes to Washington

With those points in mind, I nervously watch what happens when Zelenskyy meets Trump in an hour's time. Zelenskyy has an entourage of European leaders in tow which, if I'm honest, I think looks a bit strange but it shows they, too, are nervous about the Trump-Zelenskyy head-to-head.

Trump talked to Putin for about three hours. The Trump-Zelenskyy summit is scheduled to last a mere hour, as I understand, but we will see how long it actually lasts. Zelenskyy's arrival was not the red carpet treatment afforded Putin. When the two leaders' talks conclude, I presume there will be some form of press remarks. Then I shall be watching for Trump's first comments once he is away from the Ukrainian president, whether on his social media platform or in comments to reporters, because that is when we get Trump's sincerest views.

The Russian position remains uncompromising. Moscow expects a sphere of influence, maintained through domination of its neighbour if necessary, and Russian officials can sense that a sympathetic Trump will support pretty much anything for a promise of peace. Trump's recent turn towards greater sympathy for Ukraine's position looks to have evaporated.

Russian officials also know that other European leaders cannot replace US backing for Ukraine and that they lack the force of personality to defy Trump. Instead European leaders resort to the soft soap. None of them dares to threaten the US with meaningful consequences, such as denying it overflight rights or use of facilities on their territory, and so they press on in a futile manner.

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