BELARUS NOTES #12: U.S. DIPLOMACY
- Paul Hansbury
- Jul 10
- 8 min read
On 20 June, Keith Kellogg, the United States Special Envoy for Ukraine, travelled to Belarus and met that country's leader, Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The visit is the latest signal of a major shift in US policy towards Belarus. In the wake of Belarus's 2020 crisis, when a blatantly rigged presidential election brought mass street protests and a brutal crackdown by the authorities, US policy had been founded on two pillars: support for the pro-democracy opposition and diplomatic isolation of the ruling regime. That policy is de facto ended.
The US, under Donald Trump's presidency, is switching to a policy of pragmatic engagement with Belarus. As I argue below, this has awkward implications for the European Union (EU), will force the hand of the United Kingdom (UK) to take a firm position on its level of diplomatic representation in Minsk, and has brought the welcome but modest release of some political prisoners. In this context, I am going to try to argue that the UK can carve out a unique diplomatic role for itself in the months and years ahead.
Flattery for dictators
Prior to Belarus's 2020 election, the US-Belarus relationship had been improving. The trajectory had begun under US President Barack Obama and, throughout Trump's first term, the bilateral relationship continued to develop. In February 2020, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited the capital Minsk as the culmination of a series of senior American visitors. (The National Security Adviser, John Bolton, had earlier visited which I wrote about at the time). The merciless and uncompromising clampdown on protesters in the second half of 2020 scuppered the progress made over the preceding years.
Kellogg's recent visit was a boon to Lukashenka's image with domestic audiences. Extensive coverage of the visit in state media allowed the state to achieve a couple of goals. First of all, it implied that the US recognises Lukashenka as the legitimate head of state. European politicians who have refused to meet Lukashenka since 2020 pale in significance by comparison; US attention is the bigger prize.
Secondly, state media could convey that Lukashenka's insights and experience are sought after by world leaders. The visit of senior American officials, argued state media, affirms Lukashenka's relevance and importance in global politics. Bearing in mind that only a few weeks earlier Lukashenka had been in China eating lunch with Xi Jinping, the Belarusian state media has ample material to persuade domestic audiences that Lukashenka matters to the great powers. How much Belarus actually matters to the US is beside the point.
Both Belarusian and US representatives said publicly that Ukraine was central to the agenda of talks between Kellogg and Lukashenka, though few outsiders accept Lukashenka's efforts to sell himself as a peace broker.[1] Belarus is Russia's ally and has supported the invasion of Ukraine in a great many ways. Lukashenka cannot resume his pre-2020 pretence of offering Belarus as a neutral platform for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, and Turkey has stepped into that role anyway.
Although US engagement with Belarus already has something to show for its efforts (see below), it proves awkward for EU leaders and presents a challenge to the UK.
'Fuck the EU' (and Britain, too)
