In an interview given by Vladimir Putin coinciding with his ascent to power, the Russian leader talked about an early 'lesson' life taught him. He used to play in the stairwell of the apartment block where he lived: 'Once I spotted a huge rat and pursued it down the hall until I drove it into a corner. It had nowhere to run. Suddenly it lashed around and threw itself at me.' This, Putin understood, was how people react when they are cornered – they lash out (Putin, First Person, p.10).
Donald Trump, during an interview with Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein in 1989, similarly recalled a life lesson. He told the authors how he dealt with building inspectors looking in to supposed regulatory violations. His strategy was to ignore them. 'You can say the same thing [about] the mob. If you agree to do business with them, they'll always come back [to do more business]. If you tell 'em to go fuck themselves [...] they might try and put pressure on you at the beginning but in the end they're going to find an easier mark because it's too tough for them' (p.8). Don't engage. Don't react. Ignore the pressure as best you can until it goes away.
The war for the presidency
The interview with Trump is a curious place for the journalist who exposed Watergate to start his narrative, since we might think the book is about the Joe Biden presidency and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. In fact, while the journalism contained in its pages is often about those things, Trump is never far from its pages. There is the ongoing war in Washington DC that ensues following the 6 January 2021 insurrection and culminates in Trump's re-election to the presidency. Woodward is no fan of Mr Trump. Yet Trump now has his 'second act' on the political stage after winning the November election (cf. p.143).
Fans of Woodward will recognise his style. Short chapters racing along. Direct quotes conveying the sense that you are in the room with the protagonists as they discuss pressing issues. The style is Woodward's own and perhaps it is unfair of me to moan about it, yet it grows a little irritating because the reader knows Woodward was not in the room. So when he has Trump suggesting that the US disguise some of its F-22s as Chinese planes and let them 'bomb the shit out of Russia' (p.137), the reader knows an interviewee has told Woodward that is what the former president said. One is no wiser as to what Trump actually said.
Woodward says in an endnote that direct quotes are taken 'from the person, a colleague with direct knowledge, or from government or personal documents, calendars, diaries, emails, meeting notes, transcripts, and other records.' Since neither Trump nor Biden granted Woodward an interview for the book, the reader is left to speculate as to who is trying to burnish their credentials or tarnish the speaker with their recollections. A fun parlour game; not great journalism.
It's hard for me to think that Biden really spoke phrases attributed to him at times. A case in point is his articulation of the view – often made by Ukraine's supporters – that official US policy is to do enough to stop Russia prevailing but also wilfully not doing enough to enable Ukraine to win. In Woodward's telling, Biden sees himself confronting a 'strategic picture' that allows no other policy (p.165). That seems a little trite, fawning even.
There is also an interesting discussion about whether Russia is bluffing with its troop build up before the invasion. Woodward attributes to Biden a long-held belief that 'great powers don't bluff' (p.99). Biden may well hold such a view. I note, however, that in Alexander Ward's recent book, the same soundbite is put in the mouth of Antony Blinken. Despite Woodward's experience, it is possible that the phrase echoed through the administration and got repeated by everyone to the extent that no one knows who really expressed it first.
Middling in the east
Ukraine takes up a substantial part of the book. I am not sure there is very much detail that adds value to what has been reported in the US media over the past three years. The extent of US intelligence support for Ukraine is well known. CIA Director Bill Burns is portrayed as a brake on discussions about Ukraine acceding to NATO (p.63). That seems to be a longstanding position, which was shown in Wikileaks cables, although Burns does appear to have shifted his opinion since February 2022.
Woodward describes how, all the while the Kremlin failed to prepare the Russian public for an imminent invasion, the US was working hard to prepare its allies and forge a coordinated response as soon as Russian troops invaded (pp.64-73). It is interesting but hardly revelatory. The US may have exceeded its own expectations of the consensus western response that did ensue.
I found the coverage of conflict in the Middle East more enlightening than the parts about decision making on Ukraine. Though here, too, I was not sure there is much new information in the book. For all Woodward's doubtless high-level sources most of the material has been covered well by the media already.
When Bibi Netanyahu intends to strike pre-emptively against Hezbollah, a few days after the 7 October attacks, Biden avers that the US is 'not on board' and would not support Israel if it extends the scope of the war (p.202-3). Israel's cabinet eventually voted against an attack but social media claims, as well as some birds picked up by radar, ensured that Israel almost responded to a non-existent attack from its north. As we know, a year later Israel and Hezbollah would be embroiled.
All the presidents' men
Reading the book in the weeks before Trump settles behind the Resolute Desk for a second term, it was enlightening to read about a couple of figures who are expected to serve in his next administration. 'Retired' Keith Kellogg – who Trump has asked to act as special envoy on the war in Ukraine – keenly presents Trump as a reasonable decision-maker, listening to a wide range of views (p.264). It feels like blarney.
There's Democrat blarney, too. Whilst Woodward acknowledges that Biden's age affected his performance in the presidency, his interviewees are less willing to concede the point. Former chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley praises Biden's willingness to listen to others (p.332) and policy adviser Colin Kahn insists foreign policy was always Biden's; never Secretary of State Antony Blinken's, or National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan's, or Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin's (p.332).
Woodward's admiration for Biden is not concealed. He writes of 'genuine good faith efforts by the president and his core national security team to wield the levers of executive power responsibly and in the national interest' (p.369). This is a rarity, claims Woodward. When Biden drops out of the presidential race, Woodward says it shows that 'unlike Trump, Biden [...] could accept the hard truths, and [...] see what was in the public interest' (p.343). I think he is attributing to Blinken the notion that the decision was 'Shakespearean'. But even if it isn't Woodward's own notion, it's bombastic and not worth giving credence. At the very least, be more explicit that Blinken is the one making the bombastic claim.
The book can only end with Trump. One of Woodward's goals seems to be to show how different Biden is from Trump. It is perhaps unfortunate that he cites Biden's refusal to interfere in judicial process on behalf of his son Hunter as an example (p.313). Biden pardoned Hunter in early December. These small details undermine Woodward's assertion that Trump is 'unfit to lead the [United States]' (p.362). Most of us do not think that point needs proving anyway. So we end with a reminder that politics is messy and today's politics are messier than they have been for a long time.
Bob Woodward, War (Simon & Schuster: London & New York; October 2024). ISBN 978–1–3985–4144–3.
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