MOLDOVA, AGAIN
- Paul Hansbury
- Sep 21
- 5 min read
Next Sunday Moldovans will head to the polls to elect a new parliament. The country remains a crucial site of geopolitical contestation between Russia and the EU, ensuing the election in the state of fewer than three million people is consequential.
The current situation replicates the grubby picture last October when the country held a presidential election and concurrent referendum. On that occasion, as well as voting for their president, Moldovans voted in a referendum on changing the constitution to make EU membership an official state goal. Much of what I wrote in blog posts last year about those votes can be rehashed again now (see my previous posts: here and here).
The EU, which has given substantial financial backing to the Moldovan government, does not want to see the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) lose its majority. Russia, meanwhile, is going to great lengths to see that PAS falls short of a majority and would like to see a pro-Russian coalition in government. It is hard to calculate how much money Russia has poured into its efforts to influence Moldovan politics, but the sums are no doubt staggering.
Shor-ing up support for Russia
In the first place, there is open bribery of voters. Much of this centres on the Moldovan oligarch and politician Ilan Shor, convicted of fraud and money laundering in the past, who is now based in Russia. He is offering citizens in the separatist Gagauzia region of Moldova $100 a month, transferred to them from Russia, and as many as half of the voters in the region have reportedly accepted the payment. This is a generous sweetener – the average monthly salary was 15,470 lei (about $900) in July 2025 – buying loyalty for Russia. Salaries in Gagauzia are significantly lower than the average just cited, and pensions are smaller still.
Secondly, a BBC investigation found evidence of a network paying people to post pro-Russian information on social media. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the BBC claims to have found links to Shor. Its investigative journalist was invited to attend online training seminars and encourage to post flagrant disinformation, such as claiming that President Maia Sandu is involved in child trafficking. The pro-Russian network also appeared to be preparing to challenge an unfavourable election result by compiling its own dubious polling data.
Russia's defenders will point a finger at Brussels' generous disbursal of funds to Moldova. For sure, the EU buys influence through its grants and loans. But there are obvious differences from the money Russia diverts to Moldova. The EU's funding is transparent and targeted at economic reforms, critical infrastructure, and capacity building for tackling corruption and organised crime. Russia, strangely, chooses not to invest in such areas – preferring to buy people's votes and spread disinformation. As well, at a time when living costs are rising for Moldovans, Russia can offer lower prices for oil and gas, something that admittedly sways many citizens beyond the pro-Russian strongholds of Gagauzia and the better-known Transnistria.
