Kamala Harris and Donald Trump go head–to–head tonight in their first televised debate. The enthusiasm that accompanied Harris when she assumed the Democratic mantle from Joe Biden has faded: a nationwide poll for the New York Times this week had Trump leading Harris by one percentage point (48% versus 47%), although most polls currently give Harris a lead of two or three percentage points.
Having served as vice–president to Biden over the past four years, Harris occupies a curious position in terms of what would be expected if she wins the November election. If she were to announce policies at odds with those of the Biden term, she would risk undermining both his legacy and her own stake in what went before. In that situation, it could appear that she had wielded little influence during Biden's tenure. On the other hand, being a 'continuity' president – largely persisting with Biden's policies – can also look quite weak and be interpreted by critics as showing a lack of initiative and imagination. George H. W. Bush was the last to face the dilemma of respecting a predecessor's legacy in which he played a role while striving to establish his own authority.
I'll use this post to give a quick assessment of the Biden Administration's foreign policy. The past presidential term, I argue, leaves a mixed record on foreign policy. Harris's choices, should she succeed Biden as president, would be crucial in how the Biden record is viewed in the future. Many of Trump's foreign policy positions are well known, especially on Ukraine and NATO, but tonight's debate could offer a glimpse of how Harris's thinking is developing as she shapes her own prospective foreign policy agenda.
Biden's foreign policy record: restoring US leadership?
When Biden took office, after four years of Trump's presidency, many thought the US had some work to do to restore its international reputation. A recent book by Alexander Ward carries the subtitle 'The Fight to Restore American Foreign Policy After Trump'; that's how many liberals would formulate the basic goal that Biden's foreign policy pursued. In so far as Trump's tenure from 2017 to 2021 had questioned US commitments round the world and sought some retrenchment, Biden sought to reassert US global leadership and authority.
At first glance, there is much to criticise. Biden will almost certainly leave office with wars raging in the Middle East and Ukraine, hardly a ringing endorsement of US global leadership. It is easy to find criticism of Biden's administration for its reluctance to provide more weapons to Ukraine, or to lift restrictions on the use of US–supplied weapons for striking targets inside Russia. Critics argue that these policies only prolong the war. Other Americans, not least many of Trump's supporters, criticise Biden's administration for supporting Ukraine in the first place as part of a scathing attack on decades of US foreign policy.
Meanwhile, the shocking death toll in Gaza and barely wavering support for Israel reflects poorly on US influence for other critics. (Although it must be noted that Vice–President Harris has adopted an arguably more critical stance towards Israel than Biden.)
Biden also presided over the calamitous withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2021. While his administration tried to deflect blame onto his predecessor who had established the short timeframe for taking out US armed forces, it was ultimately the Biden administration that oversaw the fiasco.
The Republican Party has been milking that fiasco as best it can. Republicans sitting on the House of Representatives' foreign affairs committee published a report this week squarely attributing blame to Biden. The chairperson of the committee said that Biden's administration had 'the information and opportunity... to plan for the inevitable collapse of the Afghan government, [and] safely evacuate US personnel, American citizens, green card holders and our brave Afghan allies.'
Moreover, the causes of democracy and human rights, trumpeted when Biden served as vice–president to President Obama, have played second fiddle to geopolitics. Paradoxically, that might be seen as beneficial for US influence in the global south where there is often suspicion towards western states' democracy promotion and human rights agenda, but benefits to the US are far from obvious to observe. It is China that, despite some setbacks in its push for influence, is making the most concerted effort at courting the global south. Its Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, for example, which concluded on 6 September, brought delegates from 54 of 55 African countries to Beijing. (Eswatini, which has diplomatic relations with Taiwan, was the exception.)
Biden's foreign policy record: managing great power relations
A more favourable verdict of Biden's foreign policy over the past four years would focus less on the notion of 'restoration' after the chaotic foreign policy of the Trump administration – which will make little sense should Trump return to office next year anyhow – and instead focus on how Biden's team has managed the 'strategic triangle' of US–Russia–China relations.
Biden's foreign policy team came into office believing that national security should prioritise threats from other states. This departed from the post–9/11 emphasis on non–state actors that had largely prevailed through the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. The Biden and Trump presidencies were quite similar in their threat assessments in this respect, although Biden's team implemented foreign policy in a far more professional and measured style (the US withdrawal from Afghanistan notwithstanding).
At the beginning of the Biden presidency, one official said that the Biden administration would focus on 'Russia, Russia, Russia, and China, China, China' (cited in Ward, p.32). US–Russia relations, for sure, were dire when Biden came into office and are dire as he prepares to leave it. But there have been positives, such as the recent prisoner exchange, which saw the US bring home the journalist Evan Gershkovich and others from Russian prisons. For all the hard bargaining behind the scenes, however, the prisoner exchange will count for relatively little on the balance sheet evaluating Biden's foreign policy. (The US also had a prisoner exchange with Iran in 2023.)
The reinvigoration of NATO in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine will be counted as another success by Biden's supporters. Whilst it primarily stems from Russia's actions – the invasion of Ukraine motivated the latest clamour to join the alliance – the US deserves some credit for alliance management after the travails and uncertainties of the Trump era with regard to NATO.
The Eagle and the Dragon
As to managing the relationship with China, there are further positives. The US–China relationship has been more stable under Biden than it was under Trump. In part, this reflects US success at influencing the arm of the strategic triangle that does not involve it directly: the Russia–China relationship.
The US has prevented China and Russia from getting too close. While China has given support to Russia for its war effort in Ukraine, it has not gone as far as many might have predicted. The Chinese seem to care too much about relations with the US to risk jeopardising them by supporting Russia too overtly.
As a result, Russian firms are finding it hard to trade with Chinese companies because the Chinese banks handling the transactions are wary of falling under US 'secondary sanctions' (i.e. sanctions for trading with a sanctioned Russian company). China may be Russia's largest trade partner, but Chinese banks are slowing payments from going through while they carry out diligence checks. Trade is suffering considerably to the ire of Russian firms.
In late August, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan conducted a three–day visit to China. It may not have generated many headlines, with the main outcome being an agreement that Biden would have a phone conversation with President Xi Jinping soon, but it does show a concerted effort to engage China. Sullivan had an eleven–hour meeting with Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi and also met the most senior Chinese military official.
Despite some difficulties, the Biden administration's quiet and persistent negotiations with China represents a strength of its foreign policy.
Trump vs. Harris
The one thing we know from the polls is how close the race is. Among the key issues that Harris and Trump debate tonight, in what could prove a pivotal moment in the contest, will be the economy, immigration and the state of American democracy. We can also look for clues as to what Harris might prioritise in her foreign policy should she get elected.
Harris has limited experience in foreign affairs and could therefore seek to reappoint Antony Blinken as secretary of state should she win the election, which would set an expectation of continuity with her predecessor. As this summary has argued, Biden's record on foreign policy is mixed: in such a situation in would fall to a Harris presidency to determine whether Biden's foreign policy comes to be seen as a success or a failure overall.
A Trump win in November, on the other hand, will bring populist American nationalist back to the world stage – and Republicans will do their utmost to condemn Biden's foreign policy record forever.
Thanks for reading! You can support this blog by buying me a coffee or a copy of my book.
Comments