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BELARUS NOTES #9: BALLOTS AND BULLETS

Writer's picture: Paul HansburyPaul Hansbury

Next weekend Belarus holds a presidential 'election'. It is de rigueur to add the inverted commas, to call it a 'sham election' or a 'so-called election' even though most readers will already know that Belarusians are not really getting to choose their president. It will be the seventh time the country's dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has gone through this process. It has become increasingly farcical.


The blatant rigging of the last vote, in August 2020, brought hundreds of thousands of Belarusians out to the streets. Police used rubber bullets, water cannon and even live rounds, wounding hundreds of citizens and killing a small number. Police arrested thousands of protesters and many were tortured in detention centres. The fraudulent election led to Lukashenka's de-legitimation in the eyes of most western observers. The brutal crackdown that ensued continues to this day.


Lukashenka, in power for more than thirty years, appears to hope that the new election next weekend will put some clear space between today and the events of 2020; he hopes that the election will be a chance to re-legitimise himself in the eyes of both domestic and international audiences. But there are clear obstacles to any re-legitimation.


No surprises


In 2020 the official results handed Lukashenka an 80% vote share, giving 10% to his main rival Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. The announced result certainly lacked any credibility although it is doubtful that anyone knows the actual figures. With the authorities clearly panicked by the demonstration of public indignation as citizens poured onto the streets, photos of burned ballot papers appeared online (the electoral law mandates that ballot papers should be retained for at least six months).


Lukashenka turned to Russia for support. Partly in return for that support, Belarus became an accomplice in Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka's re-election next weekend will ensure a continuation of such support. Vladimir Putin might even see it as an opportunity to push for more from his Belarusian counterpart despite Belarusians' reticence about direct involvement, with one poll finding that only 3% of citizens saying that Belarus should join the war and fight alongside Russia.


After 2020, having stolen the election, the security services were given the task of ensuring full control over society was regained. Lukashenka menacingly promised 'to find everyone' who had joined street rallies. Facial recognition software was employed to that end.


Citizens are still being arrested and imprisoned for their participation in protests that took place more than four years ago. Belarusians returning to the country after a period abroad risk being detained at the border. In recent weeks law enforcement officers have searched the homes of individuals who worked as independent election observers in the 2020 election, a campaign of intimidation intended as a prophylactic against any criticism next weekend. They have also targeted people using online chat services; a medium that allowed mass mobilisation of society in the 2020 protests. Such preventive policing (profilaktika) was widespread during the Soviet era. Everything possible is being done to prevent expressions of dissent.

Bend sinister


Accordingly, the 2025 election process is being managed with great care. No one outside the country will be able to vote, leaving the hundreds-of-thousands-strong diaspora disenfranchised. For those inside Belarus, Lukashenka is striving to convince them his rule is a matter of fate: he is the chosen one. His administration has organised shows of support in the form of 'flash-mobs' and other events.


The ballot paper on 26 January will list five candidates, none of whom is a genuine opponent. Hanna Kanapatskaya, standing as an independent candidate, did at least belong to an oppositional political party in the past. More recently, however, she has taken to criticising more serious opponents of Lukashenka, who are excluded from the election, and looks even meeker than she did when she stood, also as an independent, in the 2020 election. All of which makes for a curious presidential campaign.


Aleh Haidukevich of the Liberal Democratic Party also played a small part in the 2020 election, until he withdrew his candidacy in favour of Lukashenka. In his current campaign he has continued to criticise street protests and praise Lukashenka. The Communist Party candidate, Siarhei Syrankau, fully endorses a Lukashenka victory, describing the dictator as 'a communist' who has brought socialism to Belarus. While Alyaksandr Khizhnyak of the Republican Party for Labour and Justice also advocates for many of Lukashenka's policies.


The candidates may have divergent opinions on some issues but overall the differences are too negligible to consider them as offering an alternative political programme. It makes more sense to see them as being used by the regime to engage different segments of the population in the incumbent's re-election. Lukashenka's rivals on the ballot paper do not warrant the label 'opposition', with Kanapatskaya's protestations to the contrary ringing hollow to most ears. Such is the state of electoral politics in Belarus.


No invitation to a beheading


Since Lukashenka's control over domestic politics looks secure, the international audience matters to him in this election. He wants to restore cooperation and see the lifting of sanctions imposed after the events of 2020. Undoubtedly some European and American politicians are tired of sanctions on Belarus and think the time to re-engage has come round. But Lukashenka's best signal to them – the release of a small number of political prisoners over the past six months – has been far too little to make a difference in their policy calculations about the country. Similarly, the recent 'proofs of wellbeing' concerning two prominent political prisoners makes little difference (both Maryia Kalesnikava and Viktar Babaryka, who had long been held incommunicado, dared to challenge Lukashenka in 2020).


There are unlikely to be any genuinely independent election monitors reporting on the vote. On 17 January the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it had invited the OSCE to send an observer mission but it did so far too late for the OSCE to dispatch a team to Belarus. Instead loyal observers from 'Belarus-friendly' organisations will be on hand to praise the conduct of the election. To rub in how unwanted an OSCE mission is, the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly mission deployed weeks ago, allowing it to watch the campaigning and early voting. Yet without western observers, it is hard to think Lukashenka's goal of a 're-set' with western states could happen.


Keeping pale fires burning


The exiled opposition will engage in fervent international diplomacy in the days after the election. With western states' diplomatic presence in Belarus slighter than five years ago, the opposition will be hoping to influence the western response to the vote. With only a small number of foreign journalists likely to be accredited for the election, the exiled voices may be heard more loudly than they would otherwise be.


What is unclear is the message the exiled opposition will be delivering beyond affirming the illegitimacy of Lukashenka. Tsikhanouskaya, as the leader of Belarus's democratic movement since 2020, is helping to keep the issue of political prisoners on the agenda of world leaders, but she will face questions about her own role once five years have passed.


There are other avenues for contesting Lukashenka's power. The opposition can claim some success from lobbying for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate Lukashenka. Lithuania submitted an application last year, accusing Lukashenka of crimes against humanity during the crackdown on dissent, and the ICC opened a preliminary investigation. Others are lobbying for the ICC to issue a warrant for Lukashenka on charges on the deportation of children from Ukraine, similar to the one issued to Russia's Vladimir Putin.


Whilst Belarus is not a party to the ICC, Lukashenka could still be pursued as some of his alleged crimes took place on the territory of a party state (Lithuania); and he, as the person ordering actions, could be deemed responsible for his subordinates' crimes. Lukashenka's assertion that he would track down everyone who protested in 2020 has meant pursuing people outside of Belarus. It could yet be his comeuppance.


Lukashenka hopes next weekend's election will show that the election cycle has rolled on from 2020. But there is little to suggest his critics are ready to turn the page on that year. For the moment Lukashenka looks unruffled and he will claim victory next weekend. Few European leaders will be congratulating him on the result.



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You can buy a copy of Paul's book on Belarus from your local bookseller.


"An accessible and insightful portrayal of this much–neglected country" – Edward Lucas


"Deeply–researched and valuable" – Times Literary Supplement


Buyers in the United States: https://a.co/d/ezs4ykh

Buyers in the United Kingdom: https://amzn.eu/d/8i4ec4f

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